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I.

INTRODUCTION

The notion that hospitals may be vicariously liable for negligent acts
committed by non-agent physicians on hospital premises, indisputably, has
become a fundamental component of Illinois tort law.' Vicarious liability
under these circumstances results from "apparent authority," a doctrine
adopted from the commercial
side of agency law,2 as well as the doctrine of
3
superior.
respondeat
This topic was discussed in a recent article in this law review.4 The
fundamental components of apparent authority were discussed in detail in
the aforementioned article, and therefore, will not be discussed here. In the
* Marc Ginsberg is a member of Dykema Gossett in Chicago, Illinois where he
primarily represents physicians. He earned his B.A., with Honors, from the University of
Illinois (Chicago), his M.A. from Indiana University, his J.D. with Highest Distinction, from
The John Marshall Law School (Chicago), and his LL.M. in Health Law from The DePaul
University College of Law. He is an Adjunct Professor of Law at The John Marshall Law
School (Chicago).
**
Patricia Cari Nowak is a member of Dykema Gossett in Chicago, Illinois where
she represents physicians and hospitals. She earned her B.S.N. from Loyola University, her
M.S.N. from Boston College and her J.D. from Loyola University.
The views and opinions of the authors are not necessarily those of their law firm
or the law firm's clients.
1. Gilbert v. Sycamore Mun. Hosp., 622 N.E.2d 788, 794 (I11.1993).
2.
2 FLOYD R. MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AGENCY § 724 (2d ed. 1914).
3.
See Marc D. Ginsberg, Apparent Authority and Healthcare in Illinois, 22 N.
ILL. U. L. REv. 475, 476-78 (2002).
4.
Id.
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"Special Problems" section of that article, 5 the "reliance" element of
apparent authority was addressed.6 Specifically, the author questioned: "Is7
reliance necessary to 'lure' the patient to the hospital in the first instance?
Other "reliance" issues were also raised.
The reliance prong of apparent authority in healthcare is particularly
troublesome because it simply does not work as well as it does in the
context of commercial litigation. In the commercial setting, the application
of apparent authority involves a third party's reliance on the agent's
appearance of authority to represent a principal in a commercial transaction,
despite the agent's lack of authority to do so. Therefore, apparent authority
in contract only applies when an agent executes an unauthorized transaction
on behalf of a principal. The third party is able to enforce the unauthorized
transaction against the principal if the third party can prove that the
principal held out the agent to the third party as having the authority to
enter into the transaction and the third party could reasonably rely on the
appearance of authority.8
In the commercial setting, the application of apparent authority is
sensible, as it protects an innocent third party from bearing the risk of loss
perpetrated by an unauthorized agent. As previously noted in this law
review, apparent authority in healthcare is a difficult, ill-fitting concept,
which seeks to create a fictitious agency relationship and engrafts
respondeat superior to create vicarious tort liability. 9 Fashioning agency
principles of apparent authority to fit the healthcare setting is a
misapplication of the basic principles of agency law.
The reliance element of apparent authority has become a culprit
worthy of further examination due to recent case law in Illinois. Since
Gilbert v. Sycamore MunicipalHospitalheld that "reliance" is a component
of the apparent authority equation, 0 it is valuable to re-examine "reliance,"
particularly in light of the Illinois Supreme Court's most recent
pronouncement of the topic in York v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's
Medical Center." York has effectively abolished the reliance element.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id. at 488-91.
Id.at 488-90.
Id.at 488.
See Kasselder v. Kapperman, 316 N.W.2d 628, 630 (S.D. 1982).
Ginsberg, supranote 3.
Gilbert, 622 N.E.2d at 795-96.
854 N.E.2d 635 (I11.
2006).
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II.
A.

APPARENT AUTHORITY AND RELIANCE

THE RULE BEFORE YORK

In the healthcare setting, the third party in the apparent authority
equation is typically the patient as the consumer of care. The patient is the
target of the "holding out" process - the hospital holds out, advertises, or2
informs the patient that non-agent physicians, with staff privileges only,'
are representatives of the hospital. The patient believes that the hospital
provides the care, essentially through its employees.
Under Gilbert, reliance occurs if "the plaintiff acted in reliance upon
the conduct of the hospital or its agent.' 3 This particularly unhelpful
statement has created more problems than it has solved. What is "reliance"
in a healthcare setting? If there are circumstances which prove reliance,
certainly there must exist circumstances to demonstrate non-reliance such
that apparent authority will not apply and hospital vicarious liability will
not result.
Reliance seems to suggest a mental element - if not intent, then, at
least, awareness. Nevertheless, the unconscious patient has received the
benefit of apparent authority in Illinois. 14
As noted in the aforementioned law review article:
In Monti v. Silver Cross Hospital, the appellate court
considered the case of an unconscious patient receiving
hospital care. The court held that apparent agency could
apply despite the patient's inability to decide which
hospital to attend. Essentially, the court reasoned that
persons responsible to help the patient obtain emergency
care relied on the hospital to provide this care. The Monti
court did not desire to exclude unconscious patients from
using apparent authority to hold a hospital vicariously
liable for medical negligence.
Of course, the "reasoning" in Monti further contorts the
concept of apparent authority. There simply cannot be any
12.

See

BARRY R.

FURROW

ET AL.,

HEALTH

LAW:

CASES,

MATERIALS

AND

PROBLEMS 455 (3d ed. 1997) ("A physician or other health care professional may treat
patients in a particular hospital only if the practitioner has "privileges" at that hospital. The
hospital does not pay a fee or salary to a health care professional who only holds privileges
and who has no other relationship (such as employment, a contract for services or a joint
business venture) with the hospital.").
13.
Gilbert, 622 N.E.2d at 795 (quoting Pamperin v. Trinity Mem'l Hosp., 423
N.W.2d 848, 856 (Wis. 1988).
14.
Monti v. Silver Cross Hosp., 637 N.E.2d 427 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
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patient reliance when the patient is unconscious; there is no
state of mind. That others may "rely" on the hospital by
taking a patient to an emergency room is of no moment.
There is either a reliance element or there is not. Monti is a
perfect example of how a contorted theory is easy to further
contort by merely excusing proof of an element of the
cause of action. 15
Apparent authority and healthcare in Illinois, therefore, challenges us
to uncover a factual pattern in which the doctrine should not apply. Are
there facts which would conclusively prove that a patient was neither lured
to a hospital nor treated there by relying on the appearance of a fictitious
agency relationship?
York v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical
Center,16 recently decided by the Illinois Supreme Court, is a classic
example of a factual pattern that seemed to implicate non-reliance, but
which, surprisingly, was construed to establish reliance.
B.

THE RULE AFTER YORK

In York, the plaintiff allegedly suffered an intra-operative spinal injury
during knee replacement surgery at Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical
Center (Rush). 17 He filed a negligence action against the hospital and the
attending anesthesiologist, Dr. EI-Ganzouri, and the doctor's employer,
University Anesthesiologists, S.C.' 8 Plaintiff, in an amended complaint,
alleged that the defendant anesthesiologist was the hospital's apparent
agent. 19 Following trial, all defendants were found liable. 20 The appellate
court affirmed the verdict, and the Illinois Supreme Court granted the
hospital's petition for leave to appeal. 2' As the Supreme Court noted, the
"appeal solely addresse[d] plaintiff's apparent agency claim against
22
Rush.
There were numerous facts in York that address the reliance
component of apparent authority, most of which militate against its
application:
23
* Plaintiff, Dr. York, was a retired orthopedic surgeon;

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Ginsberg, supra note 3, at 489.
York, 854 N.E.2d 635.
Id. at 637.
Id.at 639.
Id.
Id.at 638.
Id.
York, 854 N.E.2d at 638.
Id.
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* Plaintiff's 1998 surgery was his third knee surgery at
Rush since 1997;24
* The three procedures
were performed by the same
25
orthopedic surgeon;
* The defendant anesthesiologist was an employee
of a
26
professional anesthesiology group, not Rush;
* Dr. York's son was an anesthesiology
resident at Rush at
27
the time of the subject surgery;
* Pre-operatively, Dr. York asked his son if it was possible
28
to have a specific anesthesiologist for the procedure;
* Dr. York's son testified that the anesthesiology group,
University Anesthesiologists, had its offices located in a
Rush building and that all of the attending anesthesiologists
at Rush were members of the anesthesiology group. 29 He
also testified that he had no conversations with
Dr. York
30
about the anesthesiology group prior to surgery;
* Dr. El-Ganzouri testified that, pre-operatively on the day
of surgery, he introduced himself to Dr. York. 3' Dr. York
responded and acknowledged Dr. El-Ganzouri as his son's
teacher.32
Of course, other typical apparent authority and healthcare facts did
exist. Dr. El-Ganzouri wore Rush scrubs in the operating room. 33 He also
did not inform patients that he was employed by the anesthesiology group
and not by Rush.34
The Illinois Supreme Court referred to a group of five post-Gilbert
apparent authority cases discussed in the appellate court: O'Banner v.

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 640.
Id. at 642-43.
York, 854 N.E.2d at 643-44.
Id. at 644.
Id.
Id. at 648.
Id.
Id.at 647.
York, 854 N.E.2d at 648.
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36
McDonald's Corp., 35 Butkiewicz v. Loyola University Medical Center,
James v. Ingalls Memorial Hospital,37 McCorry v. Evangelical Hospitals
Corp.,38 and Scardina v. Alexian Bros. Medical Center.39 Rush wisely
argued that pursuant to O 'Banner,a non-medical/hospital negligence case,
the plaintiff must prove that Rush induced him to use Rush for surgery and
that the attending anesthesiologist was an agent of Rush. 40 Essentially, this
is the "luring as reliance" position.
In O'Banner, the plaintiff slipped and fell in the bathroom of a
McDonald's Restaurant.4 ' McDonald's contended that it was not liable
because the restaurant was owned by a franchisee and McDonald's did not
own, operate, maintain or control the restaurant.4 2 The Illinois Supreme
Court, in O'Banner,held that in order to recover on "apparent agency" the
plaintiff would need to prove that he actually relied on the "apparent
agency" in going to the restaurant.4 3 After examining the facts of the case,
the Court found that the plaintiff may have entered the restaurant "simply
because it provided the closest bathroom. . . ."44 The Court45 thus affirmed
the trial court's grant of summary judgment for McDonald's.

In Butkiewicz, a patient was directed to a hospital by his primary
physician.4 6 The patient followed his physician's advice and went to the
hospital his physician recommended.47 The patient's decision to enter the
hospital was not due to a desire to receive treatment from the hospital.48
The patient was conscious and relied upon his primary care physician's
advice to enter the hospital. 49 Therefore, the appellate court held that a
radiologist who allegedly misinterpreted an x-ray was not the apparent
agent of the hospital. 50 No reliance was established so as to invoke
apparent agency. 51
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

40.
41.

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

670 N.E.2d
724 N.E.2d
701 N.E.2d
771 N.E.2d
719 N.E.2d

632 (Ill. 1996).
1037 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2000).
207 (Il1.App. Ct. 1998).
1067 (111. App. Ct. 2002).
1150 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1999).

York, 854 N.E.2d at 658-59.

O'Banner, 670 N.E.2d at 633.

Id.
Id. at 635.
Id.
Id.

Butkiewicz, 724 N.E.2d at 1038.
Id.

48. Id. at 1041.
49. Id.
50.
See id. at 1040-41. The radiologist was not employed by the hospital, but
rather by a private group, Oak Lawn Radiologists. The patient was unaware of this fact, and
nothing occurred during the patient's visit to alert him to this fact. The patient could have
believed the radiologist to be an employee of the hospital, and the hospital did nothing to
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Similarly, in James,52 a patient entered a hospital because she was a
public aid recipient and believed she was required to go to that hospital for
care. 53 The patient testified that she would have gone to the hospital even if
she knew that her physician was not an employee of the hospital.54 Much
like Butkiewicz, 55 the James court held that this fact pattern was insufficient
to establish reliance and, thus, insufficient to establish apparent agency.56 57
Dr. York urged the Supreme Court to follow Scardinaand McCorry.

In Scardina,the appellate court was not receptive to the concept of "luring
as reliance." 58 The Scardina court held that "nothing in the Gilbert decision
indicates that the mere directives by a doctor to her patient to go to a
particular hospital is dispositive of that patient's ability to demonstrate
justifiable reliance."59 The Scardinacourt, therefore, endorsed the idea that
a patient could justifiably rely on a hospital (rather than a particular
physician) to provide care.6 °
In McCorry, a more recent appellate apparent authority case, the
plaintiff sued a neurosurgeon and hospital, urging that the neurosurgeon
was an actual or apparent agent.61 Plaintiff's wife worked for the hospital.62
Plaintiff's physician referred plaintiff to CNS Neurological Surgery or to
another surgeon employed by that group.63 The defendant neurosurgeon
was a CNS employee. 64
The defendant hospital had published literature referring to physicians
working at the hospital as "its physicians. 6 5 The hospital "claim[ed] that
the expertise of th[e]se physicians made [it a] desirable place for [medical]
care." 66 The hospital further advertised itself as a "full-care facility
supplying quality health care. 67
inform the patient otherwise. The apparent authority claim failed, however, because there
was no evidence that the patient relied on any hospital representation or representation of the
radiologist in going to the hospital. Id. at 1039-41.
51.
Butkiewicz, 724 N.E.2d at 1041.
701 N.E.2d 207 (I11.
App. Ct. 1998).
52.
53.
Id. at 211-12.
54. Id.
55.
Butkiewicz, 724 N.E.2d at 1037.
56.
James, 701 N.E.2d at 1041.
57. See York, 854 N.E.2d at 650.
58. See Scardina, 719 N.E.2d at 1155.
59.
Id.
60.
See id.
61.
See McCorry, 771 N.E.2d at 1067-69.
62.
Id.at 1067.
63.
Id.at 1068.
64.
Id.
65. Id.at 1069.
66. McCorry, 771 N.E.2d at 1069.
Id.
67.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 27

The appellate court further noted that plaintiff accepted the
neurosurgeon's treatment because of his confidence in the hospital.68
Plaintiff was not informed that the defendant neurosurgeon was not the
hospital's agent. 69 The physician's employment status was not discussed
between plaintiff and the neurosurgeon. 70 The court held that:
If a plaintiff shows that he relied in part on the hospital
when he accepted treatment from an allegedly negligent
doctor, he has met the reliance element of the proof needed
to hold the hospital liable under the theory of apparent
agency. . . Plaintiffs also presented evidence that the
hospital, in its literature, advertised itself in a manner that
might lead a reasonable person to conclude that the hospital
accepted responsibility for its choices of doctors to give the
advertised health care, and thus that the doctors acted as the
hospital agents.7'
In York, the Supreme Court then considered which version of Gilbert
and its progeny would guide its decision-the approach which requires a
patient's reliance on the hospital to lure the patient to its facility in the first
instances, 72 or a broader approach which allows a patient to rely on the
hospital to provide health care once the patient arrives at the hospital.
The Supreme Court reasoned that Gilbert did not hold that a prior
physician/patient relationship precluded the application of apparent
authority. 73 The Supreme Court, without citation, stated that:
Rather, Gilbert recognized that when a patient relies on a
hospital for the provision of support services, even when a
physician specifically selected for the performance of a
procedure directs the patient to that particular hospital,
there may be sufficient reliance under the theory of
apparent agency for liability to attach to the hospital in the
event one of the supporting physicians commits
malpractice.7 4

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 1068, 1071.
Id. at 1071.
Id.
McCorry, 771 N.E.2d at 1071-72.
See O'Banner, 670 N.E.2d 632.
See York, 854 N.E.2d at 660.
Id. at 660-61.
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The Supreme Court rejected an application of O'Banner to the
apparent authority equation.75
The Illinois Supreme Court also weighed in on how a patient seeks or
obtains care in a hospital setting:
Upon admission to a hospital, a patient seeks care from the
hospital itself, except for that portion of medical treatment
provided by physicians specifically selected by the patient.
If a patient has not selected a specific physician to provide
certain treatment, it follows that the patient relies upon the
hospital to provide complete care-including support
services such as radiology, pathology, and anesthesiologythrough the hospital's staff. If, however, a patient does
select a particular physician to perform certain procedures
within the hospital setting, this does not alter the fact that a
patient may nevertheless still reasonably rely upon the
hospital to provide the remainder of the support services
necessary to complete the patient's treatment. Generally, it
is the hospital, and not the patient, which exercises control
not only over the provision of necessary support services,
but also over the personnel assigned to provide those
services to the patient during the patient's hospital stay. To
the extent the patient reasonably relies upon the hospital to
provide such services, a patient may seek to hold the
hospital vicariously liable under the apparent agency
doctrine for the negligence of personnel performing such
services even if they are not employed by the hospital.7 6
The York analysis suggests that only Dr. Rosenberg, the orthopedic
surgeon presumably chosen by Dr. York, would not qualify as an apparent
agent. All other necessary "support services," i.e. other physicians not
chosen by the patient, could qualify as apparent agents of the hospital.77
Whether intentionally or inadvertently, the York opinion injects
"control" into the apparent authority formula. If the patient does not choose
the physician, the patient may rely on the hospital to do so, because the
,,78
hospital controls the "provision of necessary support services.
This
"control" concept continues to beg the question of employment, i.e.
whether professional services of radiology, pathology and others are
actually performed by employed physicians or those like Dr. Frank in
75.
76.
77.
78.

See id.
at 661.
Id. at 661-62.
See id. at 662.
Id.at 661.
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Gilbert,79 a classic non-agent, "on staff'
physician. This holding seems to
80
contradict the holding in Butkiewicz.
The York dissent is unquestionably correct in its assertion that the
majority opinion has "diluted" the reliance element of apparent authority
and will expand the scope of apparent authority liability.8 1 Simply put,
considering the case law which applies apparent authority to the
unconscious patient - a patient who cannot have the requisite mental state
to rely on anything in specific - and excluding only the few patients who
could possibly know the employment status of every physician involved in
the patient's case at a hospital-York comes very close to a policy decision
requiring Illinois hospitals to answer for the medical negligence committed
on their premises by non-agent physicians. Again, however, the Supreme
Court did not pronounce this policy. Instead, it presumed to apply agency
concepts, particularly apparent authority and its reliance component, which
are not well-suited for this purpose.
III.

CONCLUSION

Regrettably, York will likely leave us only with lip service to the
defense of apparent authority claims in healthcare. It is difficult to imagine
a set of facts stronger than those of York to militate against the reliance
element of apparent authority.82 Considering the competition for the
healthcare dollars of the consumer-public, and the extent to which hospitals
enter the competition by marketing and advertising, York may have
sounded the death knell for the defense to most apparent authority claims in
healthcare.

79.
Gilbert,622 N.E.2d 788.
80.
Butkiewicz, 724 N.E.2d 1037.
81.
York, 854 N.E.2d at 667 (Garman, J.,
dissenting).
82.
Perhaps, if plaintiff were a current on staff physician of defendant hospital,
plaintiff would have the requisite knowledge to defeat an apparent authority claim.

